Conflict Resolution

Outside-In: The Effects of External Threat on State Centralization

Journal of Conflict Resolution - Wed, 28/07/2010 - 13:24

Although centralization is thought to be a common response to external threats to the state, few theories develop the mechanisms by which domestic centralization occurs. Fewer still consistently demonstrate that centralization is indeed a common response to external threats in all states. This article therefore develops a comprehensive theory of domestic change in the shadow of external threat. Salient threats to the state create strong incentives for opposition forces to support the leader in power, even in non-democracies. The leadership then uses these favorable domestic political climates to decrease the number of institutional veto points that can stop future leader-driven policy changes. Collectively, this two-part theory provides a unified model of domestic behavioral change (also known as rally effects) and institutional centralization (defined by a declining number of veto players). In addition, by defining salient threats as challenges to homeland territory, the article provides some of the first domestic-level evidence that territorial disputes are fundamentally different from other types of international conflicts.

Categories: Conflict Resolution

The Accountability Effects of Political Institutions and Capitalism on Interstate Conflict

Journal of Conflict Resolution - Wed, 28/07/2010 - 13:24

Selectorate theory posits that leader accountability increases with the size of the winning coalition. Recent research contends that capitalism also increases leader accountability because leaders are more dependent on the public for revenue in more capitalist economies. The authors argue that extant tests of accountability arguments of interstate conflict initiation and targeting are flawed. Accountability theories of foreign policy expect leaders to selectively initiate disputes based on their probability of winning. Accountability arguments, then, expect a conditional relationship between the accountability mechanism and the balance of power. For example, if capitalism produces peace through accountability, then more capitalist states should be less likely to initiate militarized disputes as their power advantage decreases. The authors find that this is not the case. At the same time, the authors find robust support for selectorate theory’s contention that larger winning coalitions are more selective about using military force. Political institutions induce accountability; capitalism does not.

Categories: Conflict Resolution

The Impact of Trade on International Mediation

Journal of Conflict Resolution - Wed, 28/07/2010 - 13:24

If trade affects the costs of conflict, does it also influence the likelihood of mediation attempts? This article argues that dense bilateral trade between antagonists yields high opportunity costs since it is expensive to seek alternative markets and the belligerents will be highly vulnerable to sanctions from their counterpart. This creates incentives for combatants to limit hostility and settle conflicts through mediation. By contrast, the extent to which belligerents trade with other states decreases the likelihood of mediation since antagonists with alternative partners can mitigate the consequences of sanctions and substitute for markets, which may be at risk or even lost because of the outbreak of a dispute. The divergent effects of different trade ties imply that the impact of bilateral trade on the prospects for mediation should vary conditional on countries’ trade with states outside the dyad and vice versa. This article demonstrates that this is partially valid.

Categories: Conflict Resolution

Arming the Embargoed: A Supply-Side Understanding of Arms Embargo Violations

Journal of Conflict Resolution - Wed, 28/07/2010 - 13:24

Nearly every international arms embargo has been systemically violated by arms exporting states. Although much work has been done exploring why states transfer arms, little has been done to answer the question of why states choose to violate arms embargoes. Earlier studies have found that states transfer arms to one another for a variety of economic and strategic reasons. This study constructs a time series cross-section data set to test whether the same interests that drive dyadic arms transfers also influence the likelihood and size of arms embargo violations. Using a two-stage model of dyadic arms transfers, this study finds that measures for arms import dependence and alliance portfolio similarity best predict the likelihood and size of arms embargo violations. These results provide evidence that state decisions to violate embargoes are driven by political interests more than economic interests.

Categories: Conflict Resolution

Burden Sharing in the Funding of the UNHCR: Refugee Protection as an Impure Public Good

Journal of Conflict Resolution - Wed, 28/07/2010 - 13:24

The authors apply the theory of collective action and alliance behavior first developed by Olson and Zeckhauser and later extended by Sandler in a series of studies to test whether the nature of refugee protection influences state motivations to provide contributions. The authors investigate whether refugee protection can be viewed as a pure public good with the concomitant problem of free riding leading to suboptimal outcomes or whether contributions provide states private benefits that transform the nature of the good. Using a Heckman selection model, they test for the determinants of state contributions to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and find that refugee protection offers several private benefits, indicating that it is best understood as an impure public good. They conclude, however, that even when states are able to secure these private benefits, it does not necessarily lead to the optimal provision of refugee protection.

Categories: Conflict Resolution

Forward-Looking versus Shortsighted Defense Budget Allocation

Journal of Conflict Resolution - Wed, 28/07/2010 - 13:24

This study presents an analytical model of budget allocation into military and civilian expenditures within an arms race between two rival countries and compares the consequences of shortsighted (period-by-period) planning versus forward-looking (long-term) planning. The authors show that although shortsighted planning is favorable for both countries, they are likely to be locked in a prisoner’s dilemma in which both overinvest in arms procurement. The likelihood of overinvestment in arms procurement is higher when the perceived benefit from security is higher and when future benefits from existing arms stocks are ‘‘high’’; that is, when the rate of technology improvement over time is lower, the depreciation rate of existing arms is lower and the discount factor is higher. A dynamic version of Kagan et al., employing real-world data, finds evidence for the existence of a prisoner’s dilemma in the Israeli—Syrian arms race.

Categories: Conflict Resolution

DR CONGO: Pursuing Rebels at What Price

IPS Conflict Resolution in Africa - Mon, 21/06/2010 - 19:05
JOHANNESBURG, Jun 17 (IPS) - Operation Amani Leo, launched jointly by MONUC (the United Nations Mission in Congo) and FARDC (the Congolese army) in January to regain control of mining territories in the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu from rebels, while ensuring security for the local population has been extended to September. But Congolese women are arguing for changes in the conduct of military operations.
Categories: Conflict Resolution

Q&A: "Militarisation of Zimbabwe’s Diamond Fields Continues"

IPS Conflict Resolution in Africa - Mon, 21/06/2010 - 19:05
CAPE TOWN, May 25 (IPS) - Almost a year after a review mission of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) found Zimbabwe guilty of "serious non-compliance" with the scheme’s minimum criteria on conflict diamonds, the militarisation of the southern African country’s diamond mining operations continues.
Categories: Conflict Resolution

AFRICA: Military Manoeuvres in the Sahel

IPS Conflict Resolution in Africa - Mon, 21/06/2010 - 19:05
OUAGADOUGOU, May 14 (IPS) - Military exercises are under way in the Sahel region as part of the United States-led Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Partnership. Participating militaries are enthusiastic, but civil society cautions that force may not be enough to ensure regional security.
Categories: Conflict Resolution

Kinshasa Rejects Report of Congolese Army Atrocities

IPS Conflict Resolution in Africa - Mon, 21/06/2010 - 19:05
MBANDAKA, DR Congo, May 3 (IPS) - A report alleging that government troops summarily executed fifty civilians in early April in fighting around Mbandaka, the capital of the Democratic Republic of Congo's northwestern Équateur Province has been rejected by the government.
Categories: Conflict Resolution

UGANDA: Fresh Concerns About Women in Captivity

IPS Conflict Resolution in Africa - Mon, 21/06/2010 - 19:05
KAMPALA, Apr 20 (IPS) - The fate of thousands of women and girls held as sex slaves and child soldiers by Uganda’s Lords Resistance Army rebels hangs in the balance.
Categories: Conflict Resolution

SUDAN: Election Results Expected Soon

IPS Conflict Resolution in Africa - Mon, 21/06/2010 - 19:05
KHARTOUM/JUBA, South Sudan, Apr 19 (IPS) - Poor access to telephone networks and lack of roads in some areas of South Sudan is delaying the submission of voting results to the election commission.
Categories: Conflict Resolution

DR CONGO: Uneasy Calm After Fighting in Northwest

IPS Conflict Resolution in Africa - Mon, 21/06/2010 - 19:05
MBANDAKA, DR Congo, Apr 15 (IPS) - Fighting between "Enyélé" insurgents and regular armed forces in the northwestern Democratic Republic of Congo at the beginning of April left 18 people dead, including nine rebels, and triggered mass displacements from the region's principal city, Mbandaka.
Categories: Conflict Resolution

KENYA: Primary Education Under the Gun

IPS Conflict Resolution in Africa - Mon, 21/06/2010 - 19:05
TURKANA, Kenya, Mar 31 (IPS) - The children are afraid. There are armed bandits hiding with stolen animals in the thickets behind Nawoyaregae Primary School in Kaputir Location.
Categories: Conflict Resolution

RIGHTS-SIERRA LEONE: Journalists Under Attack

IPS Conflict Resolution in Africa - Mon, 21/06/2010 - 19:05
FREETOWN, Mar 30 (IPS) - Sierra Leone has become a place of torment for journalists practicing their profession.
Categories: Conflict Resolution

ZIMBABWE: Women Survive Political Violence Alone

IPS Conflict Resolution in Africa - Mon, 21/06/2010 - 19:05
HARARE, Mar 30 (IPS) - Mary Pamire will never forget the day a group of men took turns to rape her.
Categories: Conflict Resolution

SIERRA LEONE: No Easy Road to Reconciliation

IPS Conflict Resolution in Africa - Mon, 21/06/2010 - 19:05
FREETOWN , Mar 25 (IPS) - Former child soldier Komba Gbondo maimed and killed many people from his hometown, and the 25-year-old is still too terrified to return.
Categories: Conflict Resolution

POLITICS-SUDAN: African Leaders Call for Peaceful Elections

IPS Conflict Resolution in Africa - Mon, 21/06/2010 - 19:05
NAIROBI, Mar 20 (IPS) - With less than a month to the historic multi-party poll in Africa’s largest country, Sudan, eminent African leaders are calling for a peaceful and calm election process.
Categories: Conflict Resolution

KENYA: New Bill to Improve State Witness Protection, If Passed

IPS Conflict Resolution in Africa - Mon, 21/06/2010 - 19:05
NAIROBI, Mar 10 (IPS) - Kenyans affected by the violence that erupted after the country’s disputed presidential elections in 2007 may soon be able to speak out without fear. A new bill will offer better protection to state witnesses.
Categories: Conflict Resolution

COTE D'IVOIRE: Crisis Within a Crisis Delays Elections Again

IPS Conflict Resolution in Africa - Mon, 21/06/2010 - 19:05
ABIDJAN, Feb 20 (IPS) - A week after President Laurent Gbagbo dissolved the government and the electoral commission, thousands marched in the city of Bouaké, damaging cars and shops. There have been almost daily demonstrations in cities across the country as Côte d'Ivoire's political crisis deepens.
Categories: Conflict Resolution